The debate over world food stocks-how tion and consumption data and abstract from much, the rules for accumulation and release, spatial and trade constraints. and who should pay-continues to remain
If not much else, the current public debate high on the agenda of public debate. The over international grain storage levels and economics profession has yet to inake a sub-rules clearly illustrates that it would be futile stantial contribution on this important issue of to attempt to influence the course of decisions public policy. On the one hand, applied wel-by analyzing any one single dimension of storfare economics has given insights into who age effects. There is clearly a distinct concern gains from stabilization and economists have for maximizing expected benefits (or minimizconstructed models to estimate optimum stor-ing expected costs) as well as for increasing age levels, where the optima are defined in price and quantity stability. Equally, if not terms of single, narrow economic or financial more importantly, any discussion of national or objectives (see Gustafson; Hueth and international storage operations must confront Schmitz; Oi ; Samuelson 1972; Waugh) . On the issues arising from the incidence of benefits or other hand, some workers have made esti-losses to consumers and producers (importing mates ofthe storage levels needed to stabilize and exporting countries). In theory it is possisupplies without providing a meaningful anal-ble to resolve the trade-offs between diverse ysis of costs and benefits (see USDA). Many objectives by specifying an appropriate social studies analyze the effect of storage opera-welfare function. In practice such a specifications on the basis of a probability distribution tion is an elusive goal for it involves subjective of production without regard to the sequelce judgments on which a priori agreement among of good and bad harvests or else project the the parties is unlikely to occur. storage effects on the basis of a particular past
The approach taken ifi this study clearly sequence of years (see USDA, UN). All esti-departs from the pursuit of a single optimal mates of the effects of storage on the world's solution. A model is used to trace oat the food economy are based on aggregate produc-implications of several levels of storage activity and storage rules for several objectives. In Shlomo Reutlinger is a senior economist with the International the interest of providing useful insight3 on the Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
general orders of magnitude of the impact of This paper is based on a larger research project by the author gnrlodr fmgiueo h mato aimed at specifying country models for evaluating buffer stocks storage activities, the model is purposely kept and also draws on a earlier paper by the author (1971) . The author simple. Several shortcomings of the model in is grateful to David Blum for research assistance, to C. J. A. t,rms of the of the Jansen, and to the anonymous reviewers for their substantial complexity decision envicontributions toward improving the clarity of exposition.
ronment of the real world will be discussed and presented as appropriate topics for subsequent research.
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The Model
K
In attempting to estimate worldwide price and Pi consumption fluctuations with and without
H storage, the world is viewed as one unified
market. Fluctuations in world consumption and price are assumed to depend only on fluctuations in world production and the extent of storage activity, i.e., any friction arising from ¢ F trade constraints or shipping costs which separate regions of production and cc,nsumption is disregarded. Much more sophisticated and time-consuming models and data are 2, needed to estimate the effects of buffer stocks in a world of segregated markets. Figure 1 . Storage benefits and losses The model simulates fluctuations in the consumption and price of wheat under various benefits or losses attributable to stomage and levels of storage and with various storage rules the gains or losses experienced by producers governing the accumulation and release of and consumers each year. To ~.btain 'iet varistocks. World grain production is estimated on able benefits, variable storage costs are subthe basis of a large random sample drawn from tracted. The present value of the dis..ounted a known probability distribution. Puice is de-stream of benefits and losses over a thirty-year termined on the basis of a demand function period is then calculated. Finally, on thte basis relating the world price to the quantity of grain of a sample of 300 thirty-year sequences, the available for consumption. In any given year, expected present value of the economic and grain supplies depend on the level of produc-financial benefits or costs (the producer and tion and the amount of grain put into or taken consumer gains or losses) and their respective out of storage.
standard deviations are estimated. The level of storage activity is determined
The calculation of annual gains or losses by the level of production and the storage attributable to storage is illustrated in figure 1. rules and is constrained by storage capacity The demand curve for grain is represented by and the amount of grain stored in previous DD; Q2 iS the level of production in a year of years. The storage rules are as follows. If pro-plenty. A quantity, Q 2 -Q*,, is placed in duction is above a prespecified level (and the storage; Q, represents the level of production price below a certain level), the surplus grain in a year of poor harvests; Q*1 -Q, is released is put into storage. If production is below a r prespecified level (and the price above a cer-are P2 without, and o* 2 with storage. In a year tain level), grain is withdrawn from storage to a oor harvests, the prices are Pa without and augment supplies, frompprodsctionPupwtohthe ofp augment supplies from pi-odilCtion up to the p*1 with storage.' prespecified level. The actual amount stored The financial (or storcage operator's) gains or withdra%vn from storage is determined by or losses are straightforwvard. Assumliiing tthat simulating sequences of annual production purchases for or sales from stoi-age are valued levels and inventory levels on the basis of a large sample drawn from the probability distribution of production with prespecified stor-A single unique price corresponding with any level of producage capacity. Finally, the probability distribu-tion and storage acti i,' prcsupposcs that the trade can correctly tion of consumptioii and grain prices as-anticipate the actual levels of production and quantities of grain sociated wi different levels of worldwide going into or being teleased from storage, This prcsupposition implies, among others, that the storage operations are adminislercd storage capa.-ty is calculated.
by a public authority wh)se primary objective it is to stabilize Given the estimated qta'ntities and prices prices rather than to maximize profit. In the absence of unique which obtain with and without storage, the price anticipations, the distribution of benefits (or losses) between wit consumens, producers, and storage operator could be quite differmodel estimates the economic and financial ent than th;ut: cstimated by the model used in this study. fig. 1 ). Similarly, when grain is taken out of deviations, the value of which (14 million storage, producers receive a lower price; their toIns) has been estimated on the basis of past loss is (PI -P* 1 )Q (designated as area K in fig. deviations about the long-run trend in world 1). wheat production (Steele, The function chosen to represent the deeconomic gains and losses can be measured in mand for wheat consists of two linear segterms of consumer surplus. Consumers' losses ments kinked at the point of mean world proare of two kinds when grain is withdrawn from ductior . The parameter values of the two the market. They pay a higher price for the linear segments are specified to give a lower grain which they do consume with or without price elasticity in the range of short supplies storage (areas A + B + C in fig. 1 ), and they and a higher elasticity in the range of abundant are deprived of the amount of grain which is supplies. There are several plausible reasons stored. Applying the consumer-surplus con-why this should be a reasonable specification. cept, the consumer loss due to the decline in Observed demand may reflect buying and sellconsumption is measured by area D in figure ing for storage as well as current consumption. 1. Similarly, when grain is withdrawn from Under certain circumstances, private firms storage, consumers experience a cost saving and governments may accumulate inventories on the graia which they consume with or with-when supplies are short and dispose of these out storage (designated by area K in fig. l ). inventories in times of plenty. Whep supplies The additional grain consumed as a conse-are short and a large proportion of the populaquence of storage is measured by area I in tion lives at the margin of minimally adequate figure 1.2 nutrition, governments can be expected to The benefits (+) or losses (-) which accrue (and actually do) attempt to ma,ntain the conto different groups in any year from storage sumption of the poorest segments of the popuactivities, expressed in Lerms of the areas des-lation through increased purchases and disignated in figure 1, are summarized in table 1. tribution of food grains on concessional terins. when supplies are plentiful and the price The basic simulations consider storage comes within the range where it is profitable capacities of 5, 10, 20, and 30 million tons (30 for wheat to be used in livestock feeding, this million tons corresponding roughly to two addition to the demand for direct consumption standard deviations of world production). tends to increase the demand elasticity. Re-Storage rule A provides that production in excent sharp increases in price in response to cess of 355 million tons is put into storage (to relatively small reductions in anticipated the extent that there is vacant capacity). When supplies provides some empirical evidence in production is less than 345 million tons, grain support of the hypothesis that demand is very is released from storage to the extent of the inelastic when supplies are short (UN, p. 6).
deficit (or to the extent of available stocks in The precise demand function used in the storage). Storage rule B differs from storage initial simulations is as follows:
rule A in so far as grain is released from storp = 1374.5 -3.57< 350 age only when production is less than 335 milp = 541. 5 -1.19> 350, lion tons. where p is the price of wheat per toti and q is Stabilizationz Effects the quantity in millions of tons. The elasticity at the midpoint of the segment corresponding Table 2 summarizes the effects of storage acwith short supplies (332 million tons) is -0.15 tivity on the stabilization of consumption and and that at the midpoint of the segment cor-price. Several generalizations are possible. responding with long supplies (368 million Storage can effectively reduce the probtons) is -0.24.4 abilities of extreme events. For any given level The variable storage cost (loading and un-of storage capacity. rule B gives far better loading, pest control, and electricity) is esti-insurance against extreme shortfalls of grain mated at $2 per ton. The discount rate is as-availability for con.sumption and high prices sumed to be 8%. The present value of the than rule A. Additional increments of storage investment in storage silos is assumed to be capacity result in diminishing marginal reduc-$50 per ton of storage capacity. The present tions of the probability of being caught short. cost of constructing new storage facilities is approximately $150 per ton of capacity. How-Benefits and Costs ever. dilP to the existence of a large underutilized capacity, it is assumed that addi- Table 3 presents the expected present value of tional investment will be required only to aug-benefits (+) or costs (-) over a thirty-year ment and to replace existing capacity and period of storage operations. Several noteworthat construction will be spread out over many thy conclusions emerge. Storage benefits to years, the economy are low or negative and rapidly decline or turn negative beyond initial low levels of storage capacity. The reason for this The Effects of Storage Activity is that, as the storage levels increase, there is less turnover in storage and grain is held for The results preseited below are based on longer periods. The cost of time (interest) insimulating prodUction and storage activities creasingly dominaltes the gross henefits which for 300 sequences, each consisting of thirty accrue from buying grain when its value is low years. The obser-ved frequency distribution of and selling it when its vailue is high. As for the production of a sample of this size closely net benefits, the amortization cost per ton approximates the postulated probability dis-rises as the utilization of the .tc-lrng capacity tribution. Similarly, the sampling error of the decreases, expected values and the standard deviations of Large benefits accrue to consumers, while the estimated variables is small. 5 producers pay a high price for stabilization.
I As a first approximation. the average price elasticity was as-However, these gains and losses reach a sumed to be -0.2, based on the analysis of elasticities by major plateau, as incremental storage capacity is incountries, reported by Rojko. cre I In estimating the present value over a thirty-year period, asingly less utlized. Moreover, the addistock , in storage in the last year are valued at the expected price.
tional grain is stored for longer periods of
The initial inventory is always assumed to be zero. No attempt time, until ultimately the discounting factor was made to establish an optinmunm sample size. In view of the low computing costs, it was simply decided to use a sample large comes to dominate the gains or losses from enough to yield a low sampling error.
price changes for consumers (or producers). The high standard deviations of the present pected economic benefits (or lower costs). value of the costs of and benefits from storage However, even if rule A is followed, bufover a thirty-year period illustrate the risky fer stock operations cannot be justified on the nature of investment in storage and the folly of grounds of expected economic benefits, exusing a particular observed sequence of yearly cept when they are operated on a very small production levels (often of much less than scale, e.g., 5 to 10 million tons (about one-half thirty-years' duration) to predict the effects of of the standard deviation). storage operations. With an 8% discount rate, Since the distribution of gains and losses the sequence of good and bad harvests, par-between consumers and producers is of great ticularly during the first years following the significance in assessing the politics of stock investment decisions, can drastically change policies, it is interesting to note that rule B storage benefits. Even if the expected storage diminishes this conflict. Since grain is taken benefits are positive, the chances are high that out of storage only at times of extreme shortthe investment will not pay off. Could this be a age, grain is stored for long periods. Conreason for not expecting the private trade to sequently, the discounting factor comes to engage in large buffer stock operations? dominate producer losses resulting from unWhile, as we have seen earlier, storage rule favorable price effects. B gives higher protection against extreme
The annual, amortized benefits or costs corshortfalls, storage rule A leads to greater ex-responding with the expected present values a Gross economic benefits = finrncial benefits + consumer benefits + producer benefits.
Net benefits = gross benefits -cost of investment in storage facilities. Figure 2 illustrates the annual cost (or benefit) justified on several groLunds. First of all, for of reducing the probability of consumption grain producers more stable prices can yield shortfalls below 332.5 million tons. Without more stable incomes, unless the ups and storage, the probability of consumption being downs of their harvests are positively corre-less than 332.5 million tons is 13.6%. Several lated with world prices. For low income con-observations may be made. For any given sumers, more stable food grain prices may storage level, rule B provides more protection significantly stabilize effective incomes. Both than rule A. The marginal cost of protection groups may therefore put a positive value on increases rapidly for higher rates of protecstabilization of food prices. More significantly, tion. For instance, under rule A, at the rate of perhaps stabilization might produce positive protection of 4% (i.e., a 9.5% chance instead macroeconomic effects when sharply higher of a 13.5% chance of having less than 332.5 food prices push up negotiated wages, while million tons), an additional 1% of protection equivalent reductions in food prices do not would cost approximately $5 million. At the lead to wage reductions. Finally, our cost-rate of protection of 9%, an additional 1% of benefit calculus has not taken into account protection would cost $155 million. For very possible positive output effects and better re-low rates of protection, rule A is more costsouLrce allocation decisions related to more effective than rule B, but for high rates of stable food grain price anticipations.
protection, rule B is more cost-effective than To put the numbers in table 4 into better rule A. For instance, if 9%7c protection were perspective, it should be noted that the ex-desired, a storage level of 15 million tons, op. pected total value of world wheat production erated under rule B, could be sustaincd at an is $48 billion (350 million tons x $140). A 20 average annual economic cost of 90 million million-ton program, operated under rule B tons. Equivalent protection could be bought and giving a high degree of protection, would under rule A, only with a storage capacity of have an annual expected cost of $150 million nearly 50 million tons and at an average annual for the storage operator. Consumers experi-economic cost of $240 million. ence an equivalent gain. With average consumption at 350 million tons, consumers could Sensitivity to Assumed be taxed annually at the rate of 50¢ per ton to Demand Functiotns cover the loss of the storage operation. This would seem a small premium, for which the While the stabilization effect of stor age levels consumer would be fully compensated by his and storage rules is unrelated to the parameexpected gains from storage, neglecting com-ters of the demand function, the costs and 
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tions (storage capacity shown in parentheses) benefits can be expected to be sensitive to the million tons as compared with -0.24 for the assumed demand parameters. initial function. The respective prices at the Table S gives the annual benefits or costs of same point are $120 and $103. A more elastic storage with a demand function which is more demand function in the range of long supplies elastic for supplies in excess of 350 million does not Qhange the economic and financial tons. The elasticity of the new demand func-benefits very mluch. However, the gains to tion is -1.0 at the point corresponding to 368 consumers and losses to producers are sig- nificantly higher, since withdrawal of grain from the simulation using different demand from the market for storage barely increases functions can be reinterpreted. The difference the price. between the more inelastic and more elastic Table 6 shows the results obtained for a demand functions, within the range of less demand function which is more inelastic than average production (i.e., 350 million within the range of short supplies. Spe-tons), could be assumed to reflect the demand cifically, the new demand function has an elas-for food aid related to worldwide scarcities of ticity of -0.10 at the point corresponding to wheat. 6 The difference between the two de-332 million tons as compared with -0.15 with mand functions is the amount of wheat given the initial function, The respective prices at as food aid, qA, i.e., the same point are $275 and $189. The q -20 + .t6p p > 125 economic and financial benefits here turn out -20 p < 125 to be very sensitive, making it extremely 0 p < 125. profitable to invest in buffer stocks. But again With food aid, the price of wheat associated it is noteworthy that the storage imnpact on with the worst likely production level (314 milgains and losses by consumers and producers lion tons) is $427. In this case the quantity is particularly sensitive to the assumed shape required for food aid is 48 million tons. When of the demand function, world production is 350 million tons or more and the associated price is $125 or less, the Food Aid and Food Stocks amount of wheat required for food aid is zero. Table 7 shows the additional gains and lossIn some qualrters it is argued that separate es from storage attributab-le to the change in food grain stocks should bw held to assist poor the demand function resulting from food aid. nations afflicted with unforeseen food short-The additional economic benefits are sufficient ages. Presumably such stocks would have no to turn a net loss from storage (without food adverse effects on produicers, provided that aid) at almost any level to a net gain for as without these stocks, there would be that much as 30 million tons of storage capacity, if much less food aid. Hence, separate food aid operated under rule A. Even more significant, stocks may be politically more palatable.
perhaps, is the large effect of storage on conAlternatively, a policy which aims at assur-sumer gains and producer losses. Without ing food aid at a given level when needed and storage, the adlded demand generated by food at the least possible cost, would not separate aid during times when supplies are short food aid stocks from other stocks. With such a causes steep price rises. Hence, consumers (in food aid objective, it would be desirable to the commercial market) register large losses hold larger stocks and the value of these stocks would be higher. while producers make large gains from the The gains or losses which accrue to each added demand for food aid. However, in this country car, be estimated by summing the case, the large distributional effect of storage gains and lo5ses of its consumers and producoperations can be regarded as merely compeners. The effect of storage on an individual sating consumers for losses and producers for country's consumers or producers can be esgains incurred by them as a consequence of timated by multiplying the country's respecfood aid tive shares in world consumption and producViewed in another way, storage reduces the tion by the respective worldwide gains or cost of food aid. Without storage, the annual losses of consumers and producers. These expected amount of food aid is about 8 million shares for groups of countries derived from tons, the experted price is $223 and the ex-trend values estimated by the Food and Agpected total cost is $2.3 billion.
7 A scheme riculture Organization for 1970 are shown in involving a storage capacity of 20 million tons, table 8. operated under rule A, would reduce the exAssuiming the consumer gains and producer pected quantity of food aid to approximately 6 losses associated with a 20-million ton storage million tons, the expected price to $197 and capacity, operated under rule B, the country the expected cost to $1.4 billion. The cost benefits (+) or losses (-), exclusive of the saving is, however, largely offset by storage direct net post of the storage operation, are costs. The average net financial savings per presented in table 9. annum amounts to about $60 million.
The data in table 9 illustrate why it is so difficult to reach an international agreement, If
Internzational Allocation of demand is perceived to be relatively elastic, Costs and Benefits the distribution of gains and losses is not likely to be a stumbling block to an international The major cause for the current inaction on understanding about sizable buffer stocks, international reserve stock policy is the since all countries prefer greater stability. conflict of interest among nations. While the Conflict might arise, however, over the sharsimulation model described does not directly ing of the high cost of the storage operation estimate the international allocation of costs itself. If demand is perceived to be inelastic, and benefits, the estimates of the gains to consumers and losses to producers provide some As noted earlier, under the postulated policy the actual Centrally planned economics amount of food aid (or at least the portion of food aid which is (excluding USSR) 18.9 16.1 relevant to reserve stock policy) will range from zero to 48 million Developing countries 26.2 20.3 tons, depending on the market price of wheat. the exporting countries might question the Annual prodlutlion has been as'lImllCd to be very desirability of holding buffer stocks, no a randorn indepenldenlt V1ariable. If production matter who pays for them. In particuilar, is characteri,,ed by systematic cycles. the farmer lobbies might present a strong case stabilization effect of a given level of storage against stocks. While the expected annual di-capacity will be less than if year-to-year prorect net loss to the exporting countries is $115 duction is not correlated, given the storage million, their producers might be expected to rules suggested in this study. However, if cysuffer a loss of $248 million.
cles could be predicted with any degree of Estimates such as are reported in table 9 reliability, storage rules coijld be designed could provide a rational basis for negotiating which wvoLul(d lead to higher economic and cost-sharing schenmes. It is beyond the scope financial benefits than are obtainable from of this paper to recommend any particular storage rules appropriate to an environment of cost-sharing fornmulas, particularly since they random, indlepen(lent flUCtuations for any deneed not be based exclusively on equalizing sired fixed level of stabilization. benefits. They could, for instance, be partially A static model, which abstracts from based on ability to pay, in the context of inter-changes over time in demiand and supply connational aid programs to developing countries. ditions, as used in the current sttldy, is also In any case, mor e precise up-to-date informa-relevant to pro,jections in a dyn;tmic world, but tion and better moLels which account for es-only un(ler certain restrictive assumptions.
tablished trade barriers among countries are One set of such a.suniptions is that the slope needed to replace the illustrative numbers pre-of the dernand ftunction does not change while sented in this paper.
shifting to the right, dIalt eXpCCtCd prodUCtion shiftr at the sane rate as the demand fuinctionl, and that the absoluLte standard deviation of Limitations of the Model prodluction remains the sarme. These are plauisible but not sufficiently tested assumptions.
Several limitations of the present simulation Demand for food graiin might become more model for projecting the consequences of stor-inelastic as a conse-tience of higher per capita age operations for the world wheat economy incomes over time; technological progress have already been noted. These limitations might make it possible to produce larger outand some additional qua!;fications are now puts wvithout increasing costs and the relative briefly summarized. Su-gestions on wvays to standalrd deviation might decliiie as more proimprove any future analysis of this kind are duction comes from irrigated land. also provided. However, with different assu mptions about The storage rules are crude. More refined trends, the results presented in this paper storage rules Could increase the benefits (or would need to be modified in a predictable way. Constant elasticity over time implies that A storage scheme which operates with the slope of the demand function declines over "insurance-oriented" storage rules under time. Hence, the benefits from storage would which grain is released only in years of exdecline for a fixed range of production and tremely poor harvests can be very coststorage capacity. Alternatively, if the absolute ei:ective for achieving a high level of protecstandard deviation of production increases tion against extreme shortfalls in grain over time, storage capacity would have to be supplies. With such storage rules, 20 million increased proportionally to attain a desired tons of storage capacity could reduce the level of stabilization. If supply grows faster probability of grain supplies being short by than demand, and, therefore, there is a down-more than 5%o of the mean from 13.6',% to 4.6% ward trend in price, storage benefits would be and could reduce the probability of a shortfall reduced. Conversely, if demand grows faster in excess of 7.5% from 4% to 0.5%. than supply, and, therefore, price rises over
The annual negative net benefits, i.e., the time, benefits from storage would obviously annual insurance premium of an inisurancebe higher than calculated in the absence of a oriented program would be of the order of $50 price trend. million to $150 million, in the range of demand The foregoing model has assumed that mean elasticities considered. In terms of the world's production would be the same with and with-expected wheat production, this amounts to out storage. This is clearly a strong assump-an insurance premium of the order of 20¢ to tion, given that stabilization decreases the ex-50¢ per ton per annum. pected price and its variability (as long as we
The gains to consumers and the losses to postulate a concave demand function). While producers can be sizable. Hence, it is very there is some evidence that production re-important to assess the distributional impact sponds positively to a decline in price vari-of storage schemes. The standard deviation of ability (Moscardi; Reutlinger 1963) and nega-the expected gains or losses from the buffer tively to a decline in the expected price, it is stocks is very large, indicating the high risk of difficult even to predict the direction of bias investments in such stocks arising from the from failing to consider the expected supply progression of good and bad years in different response to storage without much more thirty-year "samples" from a probability disempirical evidence, Nevertheless, it would tribution of production. be worthwhile to construct models which If food aid between countries and within explicitly account for the interaction of supply countries is a deliberate policy objective, the and demand.
added demand during years of poor hiarvests has a significant effect on stock requirements and the benefits to be derived from operating Summary and Conclusions buffer stocks. The paper describes a simple simulation model for estimating the effects of operating a buffer [Recei Seed March 1975; re Illustrative runs of the model yield some 
